But 缸n I not making claims to knowl

But 缸n I not making claims to knowledge as I describe the state of one­ caring in moments of caring? What is offered is not a set of knowledge cl创ms to be tested but an invitation to see things from an alternative per­ S防ctive. When I d臼cribe the one-caring in particular situations, we should not infer that one who behaves or feels differently in simil缸 situa­ tions is necessarily one who does not C缸e. To begin with, I 缸n denying 由e sort of generaliubility that wo时d be required to make such a judg­ ment. Situations of relatedness 缸e unique, and it is my purpose to build a picture of one-caring from a collection of concrete and unique situa­ tions. There is, I think, a logic of the caring relation, and there is empiri­ 侃I support for much of what I shall say, but the program under con­struction do臼not evolve inevitably out of the“logic of the concept”norout of a catalog of what is known about persons caring. Both require a move to abstraction that tends to destroy the uruqueness of the caring itself. This must be captured in the caring moment-in the one-caring and i口the cared-for.When I care, when I receive the other in the way we have been discuss­ ing, there is more than fceling; there is also a motivational shift. My motive energy flows toward the other and perhaps, although not neces­ sarily, toward his ends. I do not relinquish myself; I cannot excuse myself for what I do. But I allow my motive energy to be shared; I put it at the service of the other. It is clear that my vulnerability is potentially in­ creased when I care, for I can be hurt through the other as well as through myself. But my strength and hope are also increased, for if I 缸n weak­ ened, this other, which is part of me, may remain strong and insistent.When this displacement occurs in the extreme form, we sometimes hear p缸ents speak of“living for”their children. Clearly, both p缸ents andchildren 缸e at risk of losing themselves under such conditions, and I shall say more about this when we discuss the cared-for in detail.Now, just what is the place of emotion or affect in caring, and how is it related to the motivational shift just described? I have claimed that the one-caring is engrossed in the other. But this engrossment is not com­ pletely characterized as emotional feeling. There is a characteristic and appropriate mode of consciousness in 饵ring. When we 缸e in problem solving situations, the characteristic and appropriate mode of conscious­ ness is, usually, one of rational objectivity. It is a thinking mode that moves the self toward the object. It sw缸ms over the object, assimilates it. When this mode breaks down under pressure, we respond emotion­ ally. Suppose that I am trying to open a window that is stuck. As I push, one side goes up and the other side goes down. I move very carefully try­ ing to prevent this lopsided movement. No luck. I examine the parts of the window. I hypothesize. I may examine a window that is working properly in the hope of understanding its mecharusm. I experiment Then, suddenly, I deteriorate. I beat and curse the window. Conscious­ ness has entered a mode in which it meets its objects with emotion.